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Abstract
Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epis-
temology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and
a number of arguments that purport to establish it. In this paper, I
explore which formulations of the norm are supported by which ar-
guments. In their standard formulations, each of the arguments I con-
sider here depends on the same assumption, which I call Determinis-
tic Updating. I will investigate whether it is possible to amend these
arguments so that they no longer depend on it. As I show, whether
this is possible depends on the formulation of the norm under consid-
eration.
One of the central tenets of traditional Bayesian epistemology is Con-
ditionalization. There are various formulations of this norm, but they all
agree that it concerns the way your credences should change in response to
evidence. I spell out the three formulations that I’ll consider below. On the
first, Conditionalization concerns how you actually update your credences
when you receive a piece of evidence; on the second, it concerns how you
are disposed to update when you receive evidence; and on the third, it con-
cerns how you plan to update. In this paper, I am concerned not so much
with which formulation of the norm is correct—after all, they are not incom-
patible with each other, and some are independent of each other. Rather, I
am concerned with which formulation is justified by the existing arguments.
I consider three versions of Conditionalization, and four arguments in
their favour. For each combination, I’ll ask whether the argument can sup-
port the norm when it is formulated in that way. In each case, I note that the
standard version of the argument relies on a particular assumption, which
I call Deterministic Updating and which I formulate precisely below. I’ll ask
∗I am extremely grateful to Catrin Campbell-Moore, Kenny Easwaran, Jason Konek, and
Ben Levinstein as well as two anonymous referees for this journal for helpful comments on
earlier versions of the material.
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whether the argument really does rely on this assumption, or whether it
can be amended to support the norm without that assumption.
This is important because Deterministic Updating says that your up-
dating plan or disposition should specify, for any piece of evidence you
might receive, a unique way to update on it. But this seems unmotivated,
at least from the Bayesian point of view. After all, subjective Bayesianism
is a very permissive theory when it comes to your initial credence func-
tion, that is, the one you have at the beginning of your epistemic life before
you’ve gathered any evidence. But, once that initial credence function is
chosen from the wide array that Bayesianism deems permissible, the the-
ory is very restrictive about how you should update your credences upon
receipt of new evidence. We tolerate this discrepancy because the same
sorts of argument seem to give us both the permissiveness of Probabilism
and the restrictiveness of Conditionalization. But if it turns out that these
arguments only give the latter when we make an unmotivated assumption,
this spells trouble for Bayesianism.1
I don’t claim that the four arguments I consider here exhaust the puta-
tive justifications of Conditionalization. Besides these, there are decision-
theoretic arguments by Savage (1954, Section 3.5), arguments from sym-
metry considerations by van Fraassen (1989, Section 13.2) and Grove &
Halpern (1998), and arguments from a principle of minimal change due
to Diaconis & Zabell (1982, Section 5.1) and Dietrich et al. (2016). I focus
on the four described here in the interests of space and because these four
arguments are naturally grouped together. We might call them the tele-
ological arguments for Conditionalization, for they seek to establish that
norm by pointing to ways that updating in the way it demands optimises
different aspects of the goodness of your credences, whether that is their
pragmatic utility or their epistemic utility. I leave the question of how these
alternative justifications of Conditionalization relate to the assumption of
Deterministic Updating to future work.2
I start in Section 1 by presenting the various formulations of the norm
precisely. Then I introduce the four arguments informally. Then, in Sec-
tion 2, I introduce some of the formal machinery required to state the ar-
guments. Sections 3-6 contain the central results of the paper. In those
sections, I work through each of the four arguments in turn, provide its
standard presentation, which assumes Deterministic Updating, and then
ask whether we can do without that assumption. As we’ll see, for one of
the arguments, we cannot do without Deterministic Updating; for the other
three, if we drop Deterministic Updating, we face a choice—if we go one
way, we can justify the three formulations of Conditionalization without
assuming Deterministic Updating; if we go the other way, we cannot. In
1Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that I mention this motivation.
2Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging me to clarify the scope of the present paper.
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Section 7, I ask what lessons we can learn from these results.
1 Three formulations and four arguments
Here are the three formulations of Conditionalization. According to the
first, Actual Conditionalization, the norm governs your actual updating
behaviour.
Actual Conditionalization (AC)
If
(i) c is your credence function at t (I’ll often refer to this as
your prior);
(ii) the total evidence you receive between t and t′ comes in
the form of a proposition E learned with certainty;
(iii) c(E) > 0;
(iv) c′ is your credence function at the later time t′ (I’ll often
refer to this as your posterior);
then it should be the case that c′(−) = c(−|E) = c(− & E)c(E) .
According to the second, Plan Conditionalization, the norm governs the
updating behaviour you would endorse in all possible evidential situations
you might face.
Plan Conditionalization (PC)
If
(i) c is your credence function at t;
(ii) the total evidence you receive between t and t′ will come
in the form of a proposition learned with certainty, and that
proposition will come from the partition E = {E1, . . . , En};3
(iii) R is the plan you endorse for how to update in response to
each possible piece of total evidence,
then it should be the case that, if you were to receive evidence
Ei and if c(Ei) > 0, then R would exhort you to adopt credence
function ci(−) = c(−|Ei) = c(− & Ei)c(Ei) .
According to the third formulation, Dispositional Conditionalization, the
norm governs the updating behaviour you are disposed to exhibit.
3A partition is a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive propositions. That is, the
disjunction of the propositions is a tautology, and the conjunction of any two propositions
is a contradiction.
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Dispositional Conditionalization (DC)
If
(i) c is your credence function at t;
(ii) the total evidence you receive between t and t′ will come in
the form of a proposition learned with certainty, and that
proposition will come from the partition E = {E1, . . . , En};
(iii) R is the plan you are disposed to follow in response to each
possible piece of total evidence,
then it should be the case that, if you were to receive evidence
Ei and if c(Ei) > 0, then R would exhort you to adopt credence
function ci(−) = c(−|Ei) = c(− & Ei)c(Ei) .
Next, let’s meet the four arguments. Since it will take some work to
formulate them precisely, I will give only an informal gloss here. There
will be plenty of time to see them in high-definition in what follows.
Diachronic Dutch Book or Dutch Strategy Argument (DSA)
This purports to show that, if you violate Conditionalization,
there is a pair of decisions you might face, one before and one
after you receive your evidence, such that your prior and pos-
terior credences lead you to choose options when faced with
those decisions that are guaranteed to be worse by your own
lights than some alternative options (Lewis, 1999).
Expected Pragmatic Utility Argument (EPUA) This purports
to show that, if you will face a decision after learning your evi-
dence, then your prior credences will expect your updated pos-
terior credences to do the best job of making that decision if they
are obtained by conditionalizing on your priors (Savage, 1954;
Good, 1967; Brown, 1976).
Expected Epistemic Utility Argument (EEUA) This purports
to show that your prior credences will expect your posterior
credences to be best epistemically speaking if they are obtained
by conditionalizing on your priors (Greaves & Wallace, 2006).
Epistemic Utility Dominance Argument (EUDA) This pur-
ports to show that, if you violate Conditionalization, then there
will be alternative priors and posteriors that are guaranteed
to be better epistemically speaking, when considered together,
than your priors and posteriors (Briggs & Pettigrew, 2018).
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2 The framework
In the following sections, I will consider each of the arguments listed above.
As we will see, these arguments are concerned directly with updating plans
or dispositions, rather than actual updating behaviour. That is, the targets
of these arguments—the items that they assess for rationality or irrationality—
don’t just specify how you in fact update in response to the particular piece
of evidence you actually receive. Rather, they assume that your evidence
between the earlier and later time will come in the form of a proposition
learned with certainty (Certain Evidence); they assume the possible propo-
sitions that you might learn with certainty by the later time form a partition
(Evidential Partition); and they assume that each of the propositions you
might learn with certainty is one about which you had a prior opinion (Ev-
idential Availability); and then they specify, for each of the possible pieces
of evidence in your evidential partition, how you might update if you were
to receive it.
Some philosophers, like David Lewis (1999), assume that all three of
these assumptions—Certain Evidence, Evidential Partition, and Eviden-
tial Availability—hold in all learning situations. Others deny one or more.
For instance, Richard Jeffrey (1992) denies Certain Evidence and Eviden-
tial Availability; Jason Konek (2019) denies Evidential Availability but not
Certain Evidence; Bas van Fraassen (1999), Miriam Schoenfield (2017), and
Jonathan Weisberg (2007) deny Evidential Partition. But all agree, I think,
that there are certain important situations when all three assumptions are
true; there are certain situations where there is a set of propositions that
forms a partition and about each member of which you have a prior opin-
ion, and the possible evidence you might receive at the later time comes
in the form of one of these propositions learned with certainty. Examples
might include: when you are about to discover the outcome of a scientific
experiment, perhaps by taking a reading from a measuring device with un-
ambiguous outputs; when you’ve asked an expert a yes/no question; when
you step on the digital scales in your bathroom or check your bank balance
or count the number of spots on the back of the ladybird that just landed on
your hand. So, if you disagree with Lewis, simply restrict your attention to
these cases in what follows.
As we will see, we can piggyback on conclusions about plans and dis-
positions to produce arguments about actual behaviour in certain situa-
tions. But in the first instance, I will take the arguments to address plans
and dispositions defined on evidential partitions primarily, and actual be-
haviour only secondarily. Thus, to state these arguments, I need a clear
way to represent updating plans or dispositions. I will talk neutrally here
of an updating rule. If you think Conditionalization governs your updat-
ing dispositions, then you take it to govern the updating rule that matches
those dispositions; if you think it governs your updating intentions, then
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you take it to govern the updating rule you intend to follow.
I’ll introduce a slew of terminology here. You needn’t take it all in at the
moment, but it’s worth keeping it all in one place for ease of reference.
Agenda I will assume that your prior and posterior credence functions are
defined on the same set of propositions F , and I’ll assume that F is finite
and F is an algebra. We say that F is your agenda.
Possible worlds Given an agenda F , the set of possible worlds relative
to F is the set of classically consistent assignments of truth values to the
propositions in F . I’ll abuse notation throughout and write w for (i) a truth
value assignment to the propositions in F , (ii) the proposition in F that is
true at that truth value assignment and only at that truth value assignment,
and (iii) what we might call the omniscient credence function relative to
that truth value assignment, which is the credence function that assigns
maximal credence (i.e. 1) to all propositions that are true on it and minimal
credence (i.e. 0) to all propositions that are false on it.
Updating rules An updating rule has two components:
(i) a set of propositions, E = {E1, . . . , En}
this contains the propositions that you might learn with certainty at
the later time t′; each Ei is in F , so E ⊆ F ; E forms a partition;
(ii) a set of finite sets of credence functions, C = {C1, . . . , Cn}
for each Ei, Ci is the set of possible ways that the rule allows you to
respond to evidence Ei; that is, it is the set of possible posteriors that
the rule permits when you learn Ei; each c′ in Ci in C is defined on F .4
Deterministic updating rule An updating rule R = (E , C) is deterministic
if each Ci is a singleton set {ci}. That is, for each piece of evidence there is
exactly one possible response to it that the rule allows.
Stochastic updating rule A stochastic updating rule is an updating rule R =
(C, E) equipped with a probability function P. P records, for each Ei in E
and c′ in Ci, how likely it is that I will adopt c′ in response to learning Ei.
I write this P(Ric′ |Ei), where Ric′ is the proposition that says that you adopt
posterior c′ in response to evidence Ei.
• I assume P(Ric′ |Ei) > 0 for all c′ in Ci. If the probability that you will
adopt c′ in response to Ei is zero, then c′ does not count as a response
to Ei that the rule allows.
4For ease of exposition, I’ll assume throughout that each Ci contains only finitely many
credence functions. Similar results hold if we lift this restriction, but their proofs are more
involved and these stronger results aren’t needed to make our central point here.
6
• Note that every deterministic updating rule is a stochastic updating
rule for which P(Ric′ |Ei) = 1 for each c′ in Ci. If R = (E , C) is deter-
ministic, then, for each Ei, Ci = {ci}. So let P(Rici |Ei) = 1.
Conditionalizing updating rule An updating rule R = (E , C) is a condi-
tionalizing rule for a prior c if, whenever c(Ei) > 0, Ci = {ci} and ci(−) =
c(−|Ei).5
Conditionalizing pairs A pair 〈c, R〉 of a prior and an updating rule is a
conditionalizing pair if R is a conditionalizing rule for c.
Super-conditionalizing updating rule Suppose R = (E , C) is an updating
rule. Then let F ∗ be the smallest algebra that contains all of F and also Ric′
for each Ei in E and c′ in Ci. (As above Ric′ is the proposition that says that
you adopt posterior c′ in response to evidence Ei.) Then
(a) R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c if there is an extension c∗ of
c such that, for all Ei in E and c′ in Ci, if c∗(Ric′) > 0, then c′(−) =
c∗(−|Ric′).
That is, each posterior to which you assign positive prior credence is
the result of conditionalizing the extended prior c∗ on the evidence to
which it is a response and the fact that it was your response to this
evidence.
(b) R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c if there is an extension c∗
of c such that, for all Ei in E and c′ in Ci, c∗(Ric′) > 0 and c′(−) =
c∗(−|Ric′).
That is, you assign positive prior credence to each posterior and each
posterior is the result of conditionalizing the extended prior c∗ on
the evidence to which it is a response and the fact that it was your
response to this evidence.
Super-conditionalizing pair A pair 〈c, R〉 of a prior and an updating rule
is a weak (strong) super-conditionalizing pair if R is a weak (strong) super-
conditionalizing rule for c.
Let’s illustrate these definitions using an example. Condi is a meteo-
rologist. There is a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico. She knows that it
will make landfall soon in one of the following four towns: Pensacola,
FL, Panama City, FL, Mobile, AL, Biloxi, MS. She calls a friend and asks
whether it has hit yet. It has. Then she asks whether it has hit in Florida.
At this point, the evidence she will receive when her friend answers is ei-
ther F—which says that it made landfall in Florida, that is, in Pensacola
5Note that a conditionalizing rule for a prior need not be a deterministic updating rule.
It need only be deterministic for those possible pieces of evidence to which the prior assigns
positive credence.
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or Panama City—or F—which says it hit elsewhere, that is, in Mobile or
Biloxi. Her prior is c:
Panama City Pensacola Mobile Biloxi
c 60% 20% 15% 5%
Her evidential partition is
E = {F = Pensacola∨ Panama City, F = Mobile∨ Biloxi}
And here are some posteriors she might adopt:
Panama City Pensacola Mobile Biloxi
c′F 75% 25% 0% 0%
c′F 0% 0% 75% 25%
c◦F 70% 30% 0% 0%
c◦F 0% 0% 70% 30%
c†F 80% 20% 0% 0%
c†F 0% 0% 80% 20%
And here are four possible rules she might adopt, along with their proper-
ties:
F F Det. Cond. W./S. Super-cond.
R1 {c′F} {c′F} X X X
R2 {c◦F} {c◦F} X × ×
R3 {c◦F, c†F} {c◦F, c†F} × × X
R4 {c◦F} {c◦F, c†F} × × ×
We’ll see in detail below why R3 is a strong super-conditionalizing rule
for c, but roughly speaking the reason is that it has two properties that
are jointly sufficient for being such a rule, as Lemma 2 shows: first, each
posterior that R3 permits assigns maximum credence to the evidence to
which it is a response; second, c is a weighted average of those permitted
posteriors in which the weights are all positive.
As we will see below, for each of our four arguments for Conditionalization—
DSA, EPUA, EEUA, and EUDA—the standard formulation of the argu-
ment assumes a norm that I call Deterministic Updating:
Deterministic Updating (DU) Your updating rule should be
deterministic.
In what follows, I will present each argument in its standard formulation,
which assumes Deterministic Updating. Then I will explore what happens
when we remove that assumption.
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3 The Dutch Strategy Argument (DSA)
The DSA and EPUA both evaluate updating rules by considering their
pragmatic consequences. That is, they look to the choices that your pri-
ors and/or your possible posteriors lead you to make and they conclude
that they are optimal only if your updating rule is a conditionalizing rule
for your prior.
3.1 DSA with Deterministic Updating
Let’s look at the DSA first. In what follows, I’ll take a decision problem to
be a set of options that are available to an agent: e.g. accept a particular bet
or refuse it; buy a particular lottery ticket or don’t; take an umbrella when
you go outside, take a raincoat, or take neither; and so on. The idea behind
the DSA is this. One of the roles of credences is to help us make choices
when faced with decision problems. They play that role badly if they lead
us to make one series of choices when another series is guaranteed to serve
our ends better. The DSA turns on the claim that, unless we update in line
with Conditionalization, our credences will lead us to make such a series
of choices when faced with a particular series of decision problems.
Here, I restrict attention to a particular class of decision problems you
might face. They are the decision problems in which, for each available op-
tion, its outcome at a given possible world obtains for you a certain amount
of a particular quantity, such as money or chocolate or pure pleasure, and
your utility is linear in that quantity—that is, obtaining some amount of
that quantity increases your utility by the same amount regardless of how
much of the quantity you already have. The quantity is typically taken to
be money, and I’ll continue to talk like that in what follows. But it’s really
a placeholder for some quantity with this property. I restrict attention to
such decision problems because, in the argument, I need to combine the
outcome of one decision, made at the earlier time, with the outcome of an-
other decision, made at the later time. So I need to ensure that the utility
of a combination of outcomes is the sum of the utilities of the individual
outcomes.
Now, suppose c is our prior and R = (E = {E1, . . . , En}, C = {C1, . . . , Cn})
is our updating rule. As I do throughout, I assume that c is a probability
function, and so is each c′ in Ci in C. And I will assume further that, when
your credences are probabilistic, and you face a decision problem, then you
should choose from the available options one that maximises expected util-
ity relative to your credences.
With this in hand, let’s define two closely related features of a pair 〈c, R〉
that are undesirable from a pragmatic point of view, and might be thought
to render that pair irrational. First:
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Strong Dutch Strategies 〈c, R〉 is vulnerable to a strong Dutch
strategy if there are two decision problems, d and d′, such that
(i) c requires you to choose option A from the possible options
available in d;
(ii) for each Ei in E and c′ in Ci, c′ requires you to choose X
from d′;
(iii) there are alternative options, B in d and Y in d′, such that,
at every possible world, you’ll receive more utility from
choosing B and Y than you receive from choosing A and
X. In the language of decision theory, B+Y strongly dom-
inates A + X.
Weak Dutch Strategies 〈c, R〉 is vulnerable to a weak Dutch
strategy if there is a decision problem d and, for each Ei in E
and c′ in Ci, a further decision problem dic′ such that
(i) c requires you to choose A from d;
(ii) for each Ei in E and c′ in Ci, c′ requires you to choose Xic′
from dic′ ;
(iii) there is an alternative option, B in d, and, for each Ei in E
and c′ in Ci, there is an alternative option, Yic′ in d
i
c′ , such
that (a) for each Ei, each world in Ei, and each c′ in Ci,
you’ll receive at least as much utility at that world from
choosing B and Yic′ as you’ll receive from choosing A and
Xic′ , and (b) for some Ei, some world in Ei, and some c
′ in
Ci, you’ll receive strictly more utility at that world from B
and Yic′ than you’ll receive from A and X
i
c′ .
Then the Dutch Strategy Argument is based on the following mathematical
fact (de Finetti, 1974):
Theorem 1 Suppose R is a deterministic updating rule. Then:
(i) If R is not a conditionalizing pair for c, then 〈c, R〉 is vulnerable to a strong
Dutch strategy;
(ii) If R is a conditionalizing rule for c, then 〈c, R〉 is not vulnerable even to a
weak Dutch strategy.
That is, if your updating rule is not a conditionalizing rule for your prior,
then your credences will lead you to choose a strongly dominated pair of
options when faced with a particular pair of decision problems; if you sat-
isfy it, that can’t happen.
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Now that we have seen how the argument works, let’s see whether it
supports the three versions of Conditionalization that we met above: Ac-
tual (AC), Plan (PC), and Dispositional (DC) Conditionalization. Since they
speak directly of rules, let’s begin with PC and DC.
The DSA shows that, if you endorse a deterministic rule that isn’t a
conditionalizing rule for your prior, then there is pair of decision problems,
one that you’ll face at the earlier time and the other at the later time, where
your credences at the earlier time and your planned credences at the later
time will require you to choose a dominated pair of options. And it seems
reasonable to say that it is irrational to endorse a plan when you will be
rendered vulnerable to a Dutch Strategy if you follow through on it. So,
for those who endorse deterministic rules, DSA plausibly supports Plan
Conditionalization.
The same is true of Dispositional Conditionalization. Just as it is irra-
tional to plan to update in a way that would render you vulnerable to a
Dutch Strategy if you were to stick to the plan, it is surely irrational to be
disposed to update in a way that will render you vulnerable in this way.
So, for those whose updating dispositions are deterministic, DSA plausibly
supports Dispositional Conditionalization.
Finally, AC. There are various different ways to move from either PC
or DC to AC, but each one of them requires some extra assumptions. For
instance:
(1) I might assume: (i) between an earlier and a later time, there is al-
ways a partition such that you know that the strongest evidence you
will receive between those times is a proposition from that partition
learned with certainty; (ii) if you know you’ll receive evidence from
some partition, you are rationally required to plan how you will up-
date on each possible piece of evidence before you receive it; and (iii)
if you plan how to respond to evidence before you receive it, you
are rationally required to follow through on that plan once you have
received it. Together with PC + DU, these give AC.
This is the most common route to AC, and has therefore received the
most attention. Miriam Schoenfield (2017), Jonathan Weisberg (2007),
Bas van van Fraassen (1999), and Aaron Bronfman (2014) deny (i); Bas
van Fraassen (1989) denies (ii); and Richard Pettigrew (2016) denies
(iii).
(2) I might assume: (i) you have updating dispositions. So, if you actu-
ally update other than by Conditionalization, then it must be a man-
ifestation of a disposition other than conditionalizing. Together with
DC + DU, this gives AC.
(3) I might assume: (i) that you are rationally required to update in any
way that can be represented as the result of updating on a plan that
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you were rationally permitted to endorse or as the result of disposi-
tions that you were rationally permitted to have, even if you did not
in fact endorse any plan prior to receiving the evidence nor have any
updating dispositions. Again, together with PC + DU or DC + DU,
this gives AC.
Notice that, in each case, it was essential to invoke Deterministic Updating
(DU). As we will see below, this causes problems for AC.
3.2 DSA without Deterministic Updating
We have now seen how the DSA proceeds if we assume Deterministic Up-
dating. But what if we don’t? Consider, for instance, rule R3 from our
list of examples at the end of Section 2 above, where I described Condi’s
credences concerning the landfall of a hurricane:
R3 = (E = {F, F}, C = {CF = {c◦F, c†F}, CF = {c◦F, c†F}})
That is, if Condi learns F, rule R3 allows her to update from her prior c to
posterior c◦F or posterior c
†
F. And if she receives F, it allows her to update to
c◦F or to c
†
F. Notice that 〈c, R3〉 violates Conditionalization thoroughly: it is
not deterministic; and, moreover, as well as not mandating the posteriors
that Conditionalization demands, it does not even permit them. The poste-
rior c(−|F) does not appear in CF and c(−|F) does not appear in CF. Can
we adapt the DSA to show that R3 is irrational for someone with prior c?
As we’ll see, the answer is no. The reason is that 〈c, R3〉 is not vulnerable to
a Dutch Strategy.
To see this, I first note that, while R3 is not deterministic and not a con-
ditionalizing rule for c, it is a super-conditionalizing rule for c. And to
see that, it helps to state the following representation theorem for super-
conditionalizing rules, which we mentioned informally above:
Lemma 2
(i) R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c iff there is, for each Ei in E and
c′ in Ci, 0 ≤ λic′ ≤ 1 with ∑Ei∈E ∑c′∈Ci λic′ = 1 such that
(a) for all Ei in E and c′ in Ci, if λic′ > 0, then c′(Ei) = 1, and
(b) c(−) = ∑Ei∈E ∑c′∈Ci λic′c′(−).
(ii) R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c iff there is, for each Ei in E
and c′ in Ci, 0 < λic′ < 1 with ∑Ei∈E ∑c′∈Ci λ
i
c′ = 1 such that
(a) for all Ei in E and c′ in Ci, c′(Ei) = 1; and
(b) c(−) = ∑Ei∈E ∑c′∈Ci λic′c′(−).
Now note:
12
(a) c◦F(F) = 1 = c
†
F(F) and c
◦
F(F) = 1 = c
†
F(F)
(b) c(−) = 0.4c◦F(−) + 0.4c†F(−) + 0.1c◦F(−) + 0.1c†F(−)
So R3 is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c. What’s more:
Theorem 3
(i) If R is not a weak or strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, then 〈c, R〉
is vulnerable at least to a weak Dutch Strategy, and possibly also a strong
Dutch Strategy.
(ii) If R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, then 〈c, R〉 is not vulnera-
ble to a weak Dutch Strategy.
Thus, by Theorem 3(ii), 〈c, R3〉 is not vulnerable even to a weak Dutch Strat-
egy. The DSA, then, cannot say what is irrational about Condi if she begins
with prior c and either endorses R3 as an updating plan or is disposed to
update in line with it. Thus, the DSA cannot justify Deterministic Updat-
ing. And without DU, it cannot support PC or DC either. After all, R3 vio-
lates each of those, but it is not vulnerable even to a weak Dutch Strategy.
And moreover, each of the three arguments for AC break down because
they depend on PC or DC. The problem is that, if Condi updates from c to
c◦F upon learning F, she violates AC; but there is an updating rule—namely,
R3—that allows c◦F as a response to learning F, and, for all DSA tells us, she
might have rationally endorsed R3 before learning F or she might rationally
have been disposed to follow it. Indeed, the only restriction that DSA can
place on your actual updating behaviour is that you should become certain
of the evidence that you learned. After all:
Theorem 4 Suppose c is your prior and c′ is your posterior. Then, providing
c′(Ei) = 1, there is a rule R such that:
(i) c′ is in Ci, and
(ii) R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c.
Thus, at the end of this section, we can conclude that, whatever is ir-
rational about planning to update using non-deterministic updating rules
that are nonetheless strong super-conditionalizing rules for your prior, it
cannot be that following through on those plans leaves you vulnerable to a
Dutch Strategy, for it does not. And similarly, whatever is irrational about
being disposed to update in those ways, it cannot be that those dispositions
will equip you with credences that lead you to choose dominated options,
for they do not. With PC and DC thus blocked, our route to AC is therefore
also blocked.
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4 The Expected Pragmatic Utility Argument (EPUA)
Let’s look at EPUA next. Again, I will consider how our credences guide
our actions when we face decision problems. In this case, there is no need
to restrict attention to monetary decision problems. I will only consider
a single decision problem, which we face at the later time, after we’ve re-
ceived the evidence, so I won’t have to combine the outcomes of multiple
options as I did in the DSA. The idea is this. Suppose you will make a de-
cision after you receive whatever evidence it is that you receive at the later
time. And suppose that you will use your later updated credence function
to make that choice—indeed, you’ll choose from the available options by
maximising expected utility from the point of view of your new updated
credences. Which updating rules does your prior expect will lead you to
make the choice best?
4.1 EPUA with Deterministic Updating
Suppose you’ll face decision problem d after you’ve updated. And sup-
pose further that you’ll use a deterministic updating rule R. Then, if w is
a possible world and Ei is the element of the evidential partition E that is
true at w, the idea is that we take the pragmatic utility of R relative to d
at w to be the utility at w of whatever option from d we should choose if
our posterior credence function were ci, as R requires it to be at w. But of
course, for many decision problems, this isn’t well defined because there
isn’t a unique option in d that maximises expected utility by the lights of ci;
rather there are sometimes many such options, and they might have differ-
ent utilities at w. Thus, we need not only ci but also a selection function,
which picks a single option from any set of options. If f is such a selection
function, then let Adci , f be the option that f selects from the set of options in
d that maximise expected utility by the lights of ci. And let
ud, f (R, w) = u(Adci , f , w).
Then the EPUA argument turns on the following mathematical fact (Sav-
age, 1954; Good, 1967; Brown, 1976):
Theorem 5 Suppose R and R? are both deterministic updating rules. Then:
(i) If R and R? are both conditionalizing rules for c, and f , g are selection
functions, then for all decision problems d,
∑
w∈W
c(w)ud, f (R, w) = ∑
w∈W
c(w)ud,g(R?, w)
(ii) If R is a conditionalizing rule for c, and R? is not, and f , g are selection
functions, then for all decision problems d,
∑
w∈W
c(w)ud, f (R, w) ≥ ∑
w∈W
c(w)ud,g(R?, w)
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with strict inequality for some decision problems d.
That is, a deterministic updating rule maximises expected pragmatic utility
by the lights of your prior just in case it is a conditionalizing rule for your
prior.
As in the case of the DSA above, then, if we assume Deterministic Up-
dating (DU), we can establish PC and DC. On the back of those, we can es-
tablish AC as well, using one of the arguments from the end of Section 3.1.
After all, it is surely irrational to plan to update in one way when you ex-
pect another way to guide your actions better in the future; and it is surely
irrational to be disposed to update in one way when you expect another to
guide you better. And as before there are the same three arguments for AC
on the back of PC and DC.
4.2 EPUA without Deterministic Updating
How does EPUA fare when we widen our view to include non-deterministic
updating rules as well? The problem is that it is not clear how to define the
pragmatic utility of such an updating rule relative to a decision problem
and selection function at a possible world. Above, I said that, relative to a
decision problem d and a selection function f , the pragmatic utility of rule
R at world w is the utility of the option that you would choose when faced
with d using the credence function that R mandates at w and f : that is, if
Ei is true at w, then
ud, f (R, w) = u(Adci , f , w).
But, if R is not deterministic, there might be no single credence function
that it mandates at w. If Ei is the piece of evidence you’ll learn at w and R
permits more than one credence function in response to Ei, then there might
be a range of different options in d, each of which maximises expected
utility relative to a different credence function in Ci. So what are we to
do?
There are (at least) two possibilities: the fine-graining response and the
coarse-graining response. On the former, we cannot establish PC or DC with-
out assuming DU; on the latter, we can.
Let’s begin with the former. When we notice that there might be no
single credence function that our rule R mandates at world w, a natural
response is to say that I should specify our worlds in more detail, so that
they determine not only the truth or falsity of the propositions in F , but
also which credence function you in fact adopt from those that R permits.
In fact, given that we will be comparing the expected pragmatic utility of
two different updating rules, R and R?, we need worlds that specify not
only a credence function that someone following R adopts but also a cre-
dence function that someone following R? adopts. If w is in Ei, c′ is in Ci,
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and c?′ is in C?i , then let w & R
i
c′ & R
?i
c?′ be the world at which the propo-
sitions in F that are true at w are true, the propositions in F that are false
at w are false, the person with rule R adopts c′ in response to receiving ev-
idence Ei and the person with R? adopts c?′ in response to that evidence.
And define the pragmatic utilities of R and R? at this world relative to a
decision problem d and a selection function f in the natural way:
• ud, f (R, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′) = u(Adc′, f , w)
• ud, f (R?, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′) = u(Adc?′, f , w)
The problem, of course, is that, in the EPUA, we wish to calculate the ex-
pected pragmatic utility of an updating rule from the point of view of the
prior. And that’s possible only if the prior assigns a credence to each of the
possible worlds. But, while our assumption that F is a finite algebra guar-
antees that a prior defined on F assigns a credence to each w in W, there
is no guarantee that it assigns one to each w & Ric′ & R
?′
c?′ . So what’s to be
done?
A natural proposal is this: an updating rule R is rationally permissible
from the point of view of a prior c just in case there is some way to extend
c to c∗ such that R maximises expected pragmatic utility by the lights of
the extended prior, c∗. However, it is straightforward to see that any super-
conditionalizing rule for a prior is rationally permissible by this standard.
After all, if R is a weak or strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, then
there is an extension of c∗ such that R is a conditionalizing rule for c∗, and
then we can piggyback on Theorem 5.
Theorem 6 Suppose R is an updating rule. Then, if R is a weak or strong super-
conditionalizing rule for c, then there is an extension c∗ of c such that, for all
updating rules R?, for all selection functions f , g, and all decision problems d
∑Ei∈E ∑w∈Ei ∑c′∈Ci ∑c?′∈C?i c
∗(w & Ric′ & R
?i
c?′)ud, f (R, w & R
i
c′ & R
?i
c?′)
≥ ∑Ei∈E ∑w∈Ei ∑c′∈Ci ∑c?′∈C?i c∗(w & Ric′ & R?ic?′)ud,g(R?, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′)
So, if we opt for the fine-graining response to the problem of defining the
pragmatic utility of a non-deterministic rule at a world, then we cannot
establish either PC or DC without assuming DU and restricting the set of
permissible updating rules to include only the deterministic ones.
But we might instead adopt the coarse-graining response. On this re-
sponse, we retain the original possible worlds w in W, and we define the
pragmatic utility of a rule at a world as either the expectation or the average
of its pragmatic utility, depending on whether we are thinking of the rule
as representing our dispositions or our plans, and thus whether we aim to
establish DC or PC.
Suppose, first, that we are interested in DC. That is, we are interested in
a norm that governs the updating rule that records how you are disposed
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to update when you receive certain evidence. Then it seems reasonable to
assume that the updating rule that records your dispositions is stochastic.
That is, for each possible piece of evidence Ei and each possible response c′
in Ci to that evidence that you might adopt, there is some objective chance
that you will respond to Ei by adopting c′. As I explained above, I’ll write
this P(Ric′ |Ei), where Ric′ is the proposition that you receive Ei and respond
by adopting c′. Then, if Ei is true at w, we might take the pragmatic utility
of R relative to d and f at w to be the expectation of the utility of the options
that each permitted response to Ei (and selection function f ) would lead us
to choose:6
ud, f (R, w) = ∑
c′∈Ci
P(Ric′ |Ei)u(Adc′, f , w)
With this in hand, we have the following result:
Theorem 7 Suppose R and R? are both updating rules. Then:
(i) If R and R? are both conditionalizing rules for c, and f , g are selection
functions, then for all decision problems d,
∑
w∈W
c(w)ud, f (R, w) = ∑
w∈W
c(w)ud,g(R?, w)
(ii) R is a conditionalizing rule for c, and R? is a stochastic but not condition-
alizing rule, and f , g are selection functions, then for all decision problems
d,
∑
w∈W
c(w)ud, f (R, w) ≥ ∑
w∈W
c(w)ud,g(R?, w)
with strictly inequality for some decision problems d.
This shows the first difference between the DSA and EPUA. The latter, but
not the former, provides a route to establishing Dispositional Conditional-
ization (DC). If we adopt the coarse-graining response to the problem of
defining the pragmatic utility of an updating rule, we can establish DC. If
we assume that your dispositions are governed by a chance function, and
we use that chance function to calculate expectations, then we can show
that your prior will expect your posteriors to do worse as a guide to action
unless you are disposed to update by conditionalizing on the evidence you
receive.
Next, suppose we are interested in Plan Conditionalization (PC). In this
case, we might try to appeal again to Theorem 7. To do that, we must as-
sume that, while there are non-deterministic updating rules that we might
endorse, they are all at least stochastic updating rules; that is, they all
come equipped with a probability function that determines how likely it is
that I will adopt a particular permitted response to the evidence I receive.
6Recall: we assumed that each Ci is finite, so this is well-defined.
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That is, we might say that the updating rules that we might endorse are
either deterministic or non-deterministic-but-stochastic. In the language
of game theory, we might say that the updating strategies between which
we choose are either pure or mixed. And then Theorem 7 will show that
we should adopt a deterministic-and-conditionalizing rule, rather than any
deterministic-but-non-conditionalizing or non-deterministic-but-stochastic
rule. The problem with this proposal is that it seems just as arbitrary to re-
strict to deterministic and non-deterministic-but-stochastic rules as it was
to restrict to deterministic rules in the first place. Why should we not be
able to endorse a non-deterministic and non-stochastic rule—that is, a rule
that says, for at least one possible piece of evidence Ei in E , there are two
or more posteriors that the rule permits as responses, but does not endorse
any chance mechanism by which we’ll choose between them? But if we
permit these rules, how are we to define their pragmatic utility relative to
a decision problem and at a possible world?
Here’s one suggestion. Suppose Ei is the proposition in E that is true
at world w. And suppose d is a decision problem and f is a selection rule.
Then we might take the pragmatic utility of R relative to d and f and at
w to be the average (specifically, the mean) utility of the options that each
permissible response to Ei and f would choose when faced with d. That is,
ud, f (R, w) =
1
|Ci| ∑c′∈Ci
u(Adc′, f , w)
where |Ci| is the size of Ci, that is, the number of possible responses to Ei
that R permits.7 If that’s the case, then we have the following:
Theorem 8 Suppose R and R? are updating rules. Then if R is a conditionalizing
rule for c, and R? is not deterministic, not stochastic, and not a conditionalizing
rule for c, and f , g are selection functions, then for all decision problems d,
∑
w∈W
c(w)ud, f (R, w) ≥ ∑
w∈W
c(w)ud, f (R?, w)
with strictly inequality for some decision problems d.
Put together with Theorems 5 and 7, this shows that our prior expects us
to do better by endorsing a conditionalizing rule than by endorsing any
other sort of rule, whether that is a deterministic and non-conditionalizing
rule, a non-deterministic but stochastic rule, or a non-deterministic and
non-stochastic rule.
So, again, we see a difference between DSA and EPUA. Just as the latter,
but not the former, provides a route to establishing DC without assuming
Deterministic Updating, so the latter but not the former provides a route
7Again, recall that each Ci is finite, so this is well-defined.
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to establishing PC without DU. And from both of those, we have the usual
three routes to AC enumerated at the end of Section 3.1. This means that,
if we respond to the problem of defining pragmatic utility by taking the
coarse-graining appoach, the EPUA could explain what’s irrational about
endorsing a non-deterministic updating rule, or having dispositions that
match one. If you do, there’s some alternative updating rule that your prior
expects to do better as a guide to future action.
5 Expected Epistemic Utility Argument (EEUA)
The previous two arguments criticized non-conditionalizing updating rules
from the standpoint of pragmatic utility. The EEUA and EUDA both crit-
icize such rules from the standpoint of epistemic utility. The idea is this:
just as credences play a pragmatic role in guiding our actions, so they play
other roles as well—they represent the world; they respond to evidence;
they might combine more or less coherently. These roles are purely epis-
temic, and so just as I defined the pragmatic utility of a credence function
at a world when faced with a decision problem, so we can also define the
epistemic utility of a credence function at a world—it is a measure of how
valuable it is to have that credence function from a purely epistemic point
of view.
5.1 EEUA with Deterministic Updating
I won’t give an explicit definition of the epistemic utility of a credence func-
tion at a world. Rather, I’ll simply state two properties that I’ll take mea-
sures of such epistemic utility to have. These are widely assumed in the
literature on epistemic utility theory and accuracy-first epistemology, and
I’ll defer to the arguments in favour of them that are outlined there (Joyce,
2009; Pettigrew, 2016; Horowitz, 2019).
A local epistemic utility function is a function s that takes a single cre-
dence and a truth value—either true (1) or false (0)—and returns the epis-
temic value of having that credence in a proposition with that truth value.
Thus, s(1, p) is the epistemic value of having credence p in a truth, while
s(0, p) is the epistemic value of having credence p in a falsehood. A global
epistemic utility function is a function EU that takes an entire credence
function defined onF and a possible world and returns the epistemic value
of having that credence function when the propositions in F have the truth
values they have in that world.
Strict Propriety A local epistemic utility function s is strictly
proper if
(i) s(1, x) and s(0, x) are continuous functions of x;
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(ii) each credence expects itself and only itself to have the great-
est epistemic utility. That is, for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
ps(1, x) + (1− p)s(0, x)
is uniquely maximised, as a function of x, at x = p.8
Additivity A global epistemic utility function is additive if, for
each proposition X in F , there is a local epistemic utility func-
tion sX such that the epistemic utility of a credence function c
at a possible world is the sum of the epistemic utilities at that
world of the credences it assigns. If w is a possible world and
we write w(X) for the truth value (0 or 1) of proposition X at w,
this says:
EU(c, w) = ∑
X∈F
sX(w(X), c(X))
We can then define the epistemic utility of a deterministic updating rule R
in the same way we defined its pragmatic utility above: if Ei is true at w,
and Ci = {ci}, then
EU(R, w) = EU(ci, w)
Then the standard formulation of the EEUA turns on the following theorem
(Greaves & Wallace, 2006):
Theorem 9 Suppose R and R? are deterministic updating rules. Then:
(i) If R and R? are both conditionalizing rules for c, then
∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R, w) = ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R?, w)
(ii) If R is a conditionalizing rule for c and R? is not, then
∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R, w) > ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R?, w)
That is, a deterministic updating rule maximises expected epistemic utility
by the lights of your prior just in case it is a conditionalizing rule for your
prior.
So, as for DSA and EPUA, if we assume Deterministic Updating, we
obtain an argument for PC and DC, and indirectly arguments for AC too.
8That is, if p 6= q, then
ps(1, p) + (1− p)s(0, p) > ps(1, q) + (1− p)s(0, q)
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5.2 EEUA without Deterministic Updating
If we don’t assume Deterministic Updating, the situation here is very simi-
lar to the one we encountered above when we considered EPUA. Suppose
R is a non-deterministic updating rule. Then again we have two choices:
the fine- and the coarse-graining response.
On the fine-graining response, the epistemic utility of R at a fine-grained
world is
EU(R, w & Ric′ & R
?i
c?′) = EU(c
′, w)
In this case, as with EPUA, we have:
Theorem 10 Suppose R and R? are both updating rules. Then, if R is a weak or
strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, then there is an extension c∗ of c such that
∑Ei∈E ∑w∈Ei ∑c′∈Ci ∑c?′∈C?i c
∗(w & Ric′ & R
?i
c?′)EU(R, w & R
i
c′ & R
?i
c?′)
≥ ∑Ei∈E ∑w∈Ei ∑c′∈Ci ∑c?′∈C?i c∗(w & Ric′ & R?ic?′)EU(R?, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′)
So it seems that super-conditionalizing updating rules are rationally per-
missible, at least by the lights of expected epistemic utility.
Next, the coarse-graining response. Suppose R is non-deterministic but
stochastic. Then we let its epistemic utility at a coarse-grained world be
the expectation of the epistemic utility that the various possible posteriors
permitted by R take at that world. That is, if Ei is the proposition in E that
is true at w, then
EU(R, w) = ∑
c′∈Ci
P(Ric′ |Ei)EU(c′, w)
Then, we have a similar result to Theorem 7:
Theorem 11 Suppose R and R? are updating rules. Then if R is a conditionaliz-
ing rule for c, and R? is stochastic but not a conditionalizing rule for c, then
∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R, w) > ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R?, w)
Next, suppose R is a non-deterministic but also a non-stochastic rule. Then
we let its epistemic utility at a world be the average epistemic utility that
the various possible posteriors permitted by R take at that world. That is,
if Ei is the proposition in F that is true at w, then
EU(R, w) =
1
|Ci| ∑c′∈Ci
EU(c′, w)
And again we have a similar result to Theorem 8:
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Theorem 12 Suppose R and R? are updating rules. Then if R is a conditionaliz-
ing rule for c, and R? is not deterministic, not stochastic, and not a conditionaliz-
ing rule for c. Then:
∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R, w) > ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R?, w)
So the situation is the same as for EPUA. If we take the coarse-graining
approach, whether we assess a rule by looking at how well the posteriors
it produces guide our future actions or how good they are from a purely
epistemic point of view, our prior will expect a conditionalizing rule for
itself to be better than any non-conditionalizing rule. And thus we obtain
PC and DC, and indirectly AC as well.
6 Epistemic Utility Dominance Argument (EUDA)
Finally, I turn to the EUDA. In EPUA and EEUA, we assess the pragmatic
or epistemic utility of the updating rule from the viewpoint of the prior.
In DSA, we assess the prior and updating rule together, and from no par-
ticular point of view; and, unlike the EPUA and EEUA, we do not assign
utilities, either pragmatic or epistemic, to the prior and the rule. In EUDA,
like in DSA and unlike EPUA and EEUA, we assess the prior and updating
rule together, and again from no particular point of view; but, unlike in
DSA and like in EPUA and EEUA, we assign utilities to them—in particu-
lar, epistemic utilities—and assess them with reference to those.
6.1 EUDA with Deterministic Updating
Suppose R is a deterministic updating rule. Then, as before, if Ei is true
at w, let the epistemic utility of R be the epistemic utility of the credence
function ci that it mandates at w: that is,
EU(R, w) = EU(ci, w),
But this time also let the epistemic utility of the pair 〈c, R〉 consisting of the
prior and the updating rule be the sum of the epistemic utility of the prior
and the epistemic utility of the updating rule: that is,
EU(〈c, R〉, w) = EU(c, w) + EU(R, w) = EU(c, w) + EU(ci, w)
Then the EUDA turns on the following mathematical fact (Briggs & Petti-
grew, 2018):
Theorem 13 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility func-
tion. And suppose R and R? are deterministic updating rules. Then:
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(i) If 〈c, R〉 is not conditionalizing, there is 〈c?, R?〉 such that, for all w,
EU(〈c, R〉, w) < EU(〈c?, R?〉, w))
(ii) If 〈c, R〉 is conditionalizing, there is no 〈c?, R?〉 such that, for all w,
EU(〈c, R〉, w) < EU(〈c?, R?〉, w))
That is, if R is not a conditionalizing rule for c, then together they are EU-
dominated; if it is a conditionalizing rule, they are not. Thus, like EPUA
and EEUA and unlike DSA, if we assume Deterministic Updating, EUDA
gives PC, DC, and indirectly AC.
6.2 EUDA without Deterministic Updating
Now suppose we permit non-deterministic updating rules as well as deter-
ministic ones. As before, there are two approaches: the fine- and coarse-
graining approaches. Here is the relevant result for the fine-graining ap-
proach:
Theorem 14 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility func-
tion. Then:
(i) If R is a weak or strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, there is no 〈c?, R?〉
such that, for all Ei in E , w in Ei, c′ in Ci and c?′ in C?i
EU(〈c, R〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′) < EU(〈c?, R?〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′)
(ii) There are rules R that are not weak or strong super-conditionalizing rules
for c such that there is no 〈c?, R?〉 such that, for all Ei in E , w in Ei, c′ in Ci
and c?′ in C?i
EU(〈c, R〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′) < EU(〈c?, R?〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′)
Interpreted in this way, then, and without the assumption of Deterministic
Updating, EUDA is the weakest of all the arguments. Whereas DSA at
least establishes that your updating rule should be a weak or strong super-
conditionalizing for your prior, even if it does not establish that it should
be conditionalizing, EUDA does not establish even that.
And here is the relevant result for the coarse-graining approach:
Theorem 15 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility func-
tion. Then, if 〈c, R〉 is not a conditionalizing pair, there is an alternative pair
〈c?, R?〉 such that, for all w,
EU(〈c, R〉, w) < EU(〈c?, R?〉, w)
This therefore supports an argument for PC and DC and indirectly AC as
well.
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7 Conclusion
One upshot of this investigation is that, so long as we assume Deterministic
Updating (DU), all four arguments support the same conclusions, namely,
Plan (PC) and Dispositional (DC) Conditionalization, and also Actual Con-
ditionalization (AC). But once we drop DU, that agreement vanishes.
Without DU, DSA shows only that, if we plan to update using a particu-
lar rule, it should be a super-conditionalizating rule for our prior; and sim-
ilarly for our dispositions. As a result, it cannot support AC. Indeed, it can
support only the weakest restrictions on our actual updating behaviour,
since nearly any such behaviour can be seen as an implementation of a
super-conditionalizing rule—as long as we become certain of the evidence
we receive after we receive it, we can be represented as having followed a
strong super-conditionalizing rule.
EPUA, EEUA, and EUDA are more hopeful, at least if we adopt the
coarse-graining response to the question of how to define the pragmatic
or epistemic utility of a non-deterministic updating rule at a world. Let’s
consider our updating dispositions first. It seems natural to assume that,
even if these are not deterministic, they are at least governed by objective
chances. If so, and if we define the pragmatic or epistemic utility of the rule
that represents those dispositions to be the expectation of the pragmatic or
epistemic utility of the credence functions it produces, then we obtain DC
without assuming DU. That is, we can justify DU by appealing to prag-
matic or epistemic utility. However, if we use the fine-graining response,
this isn’t possible. And similarly when we consider our updating plans.
Here, if we use the coarse-graining response and define the pragmatic or
epistemic utility of the rule that represents our plan to be the average prag-
matic or epistemic utility of the credence functions it produces, then we
obtain PC without assuming DU. And again, if we use the fine-graining
response, this isn’t possible. Indeed, if we use the fine-graining approach,
EPUA and EEUA establish only that you should plan to update using a
weak or strong super-conditionalizing rule. And EUDA doesn’t even es-
tablish that.
So, at least if we look just to our existing arguments for Conditionaliza-
tion, the fates of DC and PC seem to turn on making one of two responses.
First, we might simply assume Deterministic Updating. That is, to establish
PC, we might simply assume that we are rationally required to plan to up-
date in a deterministic way; and, to establish DC, we might assume that we
are rationally required to have deterministic updating dispositions. This
doesn’t seem promising. Typically, those philosophers who offer one of
the four arguments for Conditionalization studied here do so precisely be-
cause we aren’t content to make brute normative assumptions about how
it is rational to update; we wish to know what is so good about updat-
ing in the way that Conditionalization describes and what is so bad about
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updating in some other way. Part of that is a desire to know what is so
good about updating deterministically and what is so bad about updating
non-deterministically. As I mentioned at the beginning, the four arguments
considered here are teleological, so they specifically tell you the goods that
Conditionalization and deterministic updating obtain for you. To simply
assume DU is to leave the latter a mystery.
Second, we might take the coarse-graining response to the problem of
defining pragmatic and epistemic utility, and then appeal to EPUA, EEUA,
or EUDA. This seems more promising. That response certainly seems reasonable—
that is, it produces a reasonable way to define the pragmatic or epistemic
utility of an updating rule at a coarse-grained world. The problem is that
we need to do more than that if we are to establish DC and PC. It is not suf-
ficient to show that the coarse-graining response is reasonable and there-
fore permissible. We have to show that it is mandatory. After all, if the fine-
and the coarse-graining responses are both permissible, then there is a per-
missible way of defining pragmatic and epistemic utility on which non-
conditionalizing updating rules are permissible. And that suggests that
those rules are themselves permissible. And that conflicts with DC and
PC. What is needed is an argument that the fine-graining response is not
legitimate. For myself, I don’t see what that might be.
8 Appendix: Proofs
Recall:
(a) R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c if there is an extension c∗
of c such that, for all Ei in E and c′ in Ci, if c∗(Ric′) > 0, then c′(−) =
c∗(−|Ric′).
(b) R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c if there is an extension
c∗ of c such that, for all Ei in E and c′ in Ci, c∗(Ric′) > 0 and c′(−) =
c∗(−|Ric′).
8.1 Dutch Strategy Argument
Lemma 2
(i) R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c iff there is, for each Ei in E and
c′ in Ci, 0 ≤ λic′ ≤ 1 with ∑Ei∈E ∑c′∈Ci λic′ = 1 such that
(a) for all Ei in E and c′ in Ci, if λic′ > 0, then c′(Ei) = 1, and
(b) c(−) = ∑Ei∈E ∑c′∈Ci λic′c′(−)
(ii) R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c iff there is, for each Ei in E
and c′ in Ci, 0 < λic′ < 1 with ∑Ei∈E ∑c′∈Ci λ
i
c′ = 1 such that
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(a) for all Ei in E and c′ in Ci, c′(Ei) = 1; and
(b) c(−) = ∑Ei∈E ∑c′∈Ci λic′c′(−)
Proof of Lemma 2. Let’s take (i) first. We’ll begin with the left-to-right
direction.
Suppose R is a weak superconditionalizing rule for c. Then, if c∗(Ric′) >
0, then c′(Ei) = c∗(Ei|Ric′). But Ric′ says that you received evidence Ei and
responded by adopting credence function c′. So Ric′ entails Ei, and thus
c∗(Ei|Ric′) = 1. So c′(Ei) = 1. That gives (a).
Next, for each Ei in E and c′ in Ci, let λic′ = c∗(Ric′). Now, for each Ei
in E and c′ in Ci, and for each possible world w, we have c∗(w & Ric′) =
c∗(Ric′)c
′(w). Thus:
c(w) = c∗(w) since c∗ extends c
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(w & Ric′) by Finite Additivity of c∗
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(Ric′)c
′(w) as noted above
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
λic′c
′(w)
as required. This gives (b).
Second, we take the right-to-left direction of (i). Suppose (a) and (b)
hold. Then there is, for each Ei in E and c′ in Ci, 0 ≤ λic′ ≤ 1 with
∑Ei∈E ∑c′∈Ci λ
i
c′ = 1 such that
c(−) = ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
λic′c
′(−)
So, given a possible world w, Ei in E , and c′ in Ci, let
c∗(w & Ric′) = λ
i
c′c
′(w)
Then
• For any possible world w,
c∗(w) = ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(w & Ric′) = ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
λic′c
′(w) = c(w)
So c∗ is an extension of c.
• For any possible world w, Ei in E , and c′ in Ci, if c∗(Ric′) > 0, then
c∗(w|Ric′) =
c∗(w & Ric′)
c∗(Ric′)
=
λic′c
′(w)
∑w′∈W λic′c′(w′)
=
λic′c
′(w)
λic′ ∑w′∈W c′(w′)
= c′(w)
and thus c′(Ei) = c∗(Ei|Ric′) = 1.
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Thus, R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c. This establishes Lemma
2(i).
The proof of Lemma 2(ii) proceeds in exactly the same way. 2
Theorem 3
(i) If R is not a weak or strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, then it is
vulnerable at least to a weak Dutch Strategy, and possibly to a strong Dutch
Strategy.
(ii) If R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, then it is not vulnerable
even to a weak Dutch Strategy.
Proof of Theorem 3. First, (i). Suppose R is not a weak or strong super-
conditionalizing rule for c. Then, by Lemma 2, either
(a) c′(Ei) < 1 for some Ei in E and c′ in Ci; or
(b) c is not in the convex hull of R.9
Let’s take these in turn.
First, (a). Suppose that c′(Ei) < p < 1 for some Ei in E and c′ in Ci. Then let
Xic′ be an option that has utility−(1− p) if Ei is true and p if not. And let Yic′
be the option that has utility 0 regardless. Then offer no decision problem
at the earlier time and offer one at the later time only if the agent learns Ei
and adopts c′; and in that situation, offer dic′ = {Xic′ , Yic′}. Then the agent
will choose Xic′ , but that will do worse than Y
i
c′ at all worlds at which Ei is
true. So 〈c, R〉 is vulnerable to a weak Dutch Strategy.
Second, (b). Suppose c is not in the convex hull of the set of posteriors that
R permits. That is, c is not in the convex hull of the set {c′ : (∃Ei ∈ E)(c′ ∈
Ci)}. Now, let’s represent each credence function on F by the vector of the
values that it takes the possible worlds w in W. Thus, if W = {w1, . . . , wm},
then we represent c by 〈c(w1), . . . , c(wm)〉; and, for any Ei in E and c′ in Ci,
we represent c′ by 〈c′(w1), . . . , c′(wm)〉. Now, since c is outside the convex
hull of the set of posteriors that R permits, the vector that represents c is
outside the convex hull of the set of vectors that represent the posteriors
that R permits. Thus, by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, there is a
vector S = 〈S1, . . . , Sm〉 such that, for any Ei in E and c′ in Ci,
c′ · S < c · S
Then pick m, ε such that c′ · S < m− ε < m < c · S. Now let:
9The convex hull of a set of points is the smallest convex set that contains it as a subset.
A set is convex if, for any two points in it, any convex combination of those two points also
lies in the set.
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• A be the option that has utility Si at world wi;
• B be the option that has utility m at world wi;
• B− ε be the option that has utility m− ε at world wi.
Then, let d = {A, B}. Your prior c will choose A, since the expected utility
of A is c · S, while the expected utility of B is m. And let d′ = {A, B −
ε}. Then each of your possible posteriors c′ will choose B − ε, since the
expected utility of A is c′ · S, while the expected utility of B − ε is m − ε.
Choosing B from d and A from d′ is guaranteed to have greater total utility
than choosing A from d and B − ε from d′. So 〈c, R〉 is vulnerable to a
strong Dutch Strategy. This establishes Theorem 3(i).
Second, (ii). Suppose there are decision problems d and dic′ for each Ei in E
and c′ in Ci. And suppose d = {A, B} and dic′ = {Xic′ , Yic′}. Now suppose c
would choose A over B and, for each Ei in E and c′ in Ci, c′ would choose
Xic′ over Y
i
c′ . So:
(a) ∑w∈W c(w)u(A, w) > ∑w∈W c(w)u(B, w)
(b) ∑w∈W c′(w)u(Xic′ , w) > ∑w∈W c
′(w)u(Yic′ , w), for all Ei in E and c′ in
Ci
Now, suppose that, for each Ei in E , w in Ei, and c′ in Ci,
u(A, w) + u(Xic′ , w) < u(B, w) + u(Y
i
c′ , w) (†)
Then
∑
w∈W
c(w)u(A, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(Ric′) ∑
w∈W
c′(w)u(Xic′ , w)
= ∑
w∈W
c∗(w)u(A, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(Ric′)c
′(w)u(Xic′ , w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(w & Ric′)u(A, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(w & Ric′)u(X
i
c′ , w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(w & Ric′)[u(A, w) + u(X
i
c′ , w)]
< ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(w & Ric′)[u(B, w) + u(Y
i
c′ , w)] by (†)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(w & Ric′)u(B, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(w & Ric′)u(Y
i
c′ , w)
= ∑
w∈W
c∗(w)u(B, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(Ric′)c
′(w)u(Yic′ , w)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)u(B, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(Ric′) ∑
w∈W
c′(w)u(Yic′ , w)
But this contradicts (a) and (b). This establishes Theorem 3(ii). 2
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8.2 Expected Pragmatic Utility Argument
We first prove the following lemma. Theorems 5, 7, and 8 all follow as
corollaries.
Lemma 16
(i) If R, R? are conditionalizing rules for c, and f , g are selection functions,
then for all decision problems d
∑
w∈W
c(w)ud, f (R, w) = ∑
w∈W
c(w)ud,g(R?, w)
(ii) If R is a conditionalizing rule for c, and R? is not, and f , g are selection
functions, then for all decision problems d,
∑
w∈W
c(w)ud, f (R, w) ≥ ∑
w∈W
c(w)ud,g(R?, w)
with strict inequality for some decision problems d.
Proof. First, (i). Suppose R and R? are conditionalizing rules for c, and f , g
are selection functions. So:
• R = (E = {E1, . . . , En}, C = {C1, . . . , Cn}) and
• R? = (E = {E1, . . . , En}, C = {C?1 , . . . , C?n}).
And, if c(Ei) > 0,
• Ci = {ci} and C?i = {c?i };
• ci(−)c(Ei) = c(− & Ei) = c?i (−)c(Ei);
• ci(−) = c(−|Ei) = c?i (−).
Suppose d is a decision problem. Then,
• If c(Ei) > 0, then ci(−) = c?i (−), and thus
∑
w∈W
ci(w)u(Adci , f , w) = ∑
w∈W
c?i (w)u(A
d
c?i ,g
, w)
so
c(Ei) ∑
w∈W
ci(w)u(Adci , f , w) = c(Ei) ∑
w∈W
c?i (w)u(A
d
c?i ,g
, w)
• If c(Ei) = 0, then
c(Ei) ∑
w∈W
ci(w)u(Adci , f , w) = 0 = c(Ei) ∑
w∈W
c?i (w)u(A
d
c?i ,g
, w)
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So
∑
w∈W
c(w)ud, f (R, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w)u(Adci , f , w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(Ei)ci(w)u(Adci , f , w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈W
ci(w)u(Adci , f , w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈W
c?i (w)u(A
d
c?i ,g
, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(Ei)c?i (w)u(A
d
c?i ,g
, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w)u(Adc?i ,g, w)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)ud,g(R?, w)
as required. This establishes Lemma 16(i).
Second, (ii). Suppose R is a conditionalizing rule, and R? is not, and f ,
g are selection functions. Then, if c(Ei) > 0, then Ci = {ci}, ci(Ei) = 1, and
c(w) = ci(w)c(Ei). Now, suppose that, for each Ei in E and c′ in C?i , there is
αic′ > 0 such that for each Ei in E , ∑c′∈C?i αic′ = 1 and
ud, f (R?, w) = ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′u(A
d
c′, f , w)
Then, for all Ei in E and c′ in C?i ,
∑
w∈W
ci(w)u(Adci , f , w) ≥ ∑
w∈W
ci(w)u(Adc′,g, w)
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And thus
∑
w∈W
c(w)ud, f (R, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w)u(Adci , f , w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈Ei
ci(w)u(Adci , f , w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈W
ci(w) ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′u(A
d
ci , f , w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′ ∑
w∈W
ci(w)u(Adci , f , w)
≥ ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′ ∑
w∈W
ci(w)u(Adc′,g, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈Ei
ci(w) ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′u(A
d
c′,g, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w) ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′u(A
d
c′,g, w)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)ud,g(R?, w)
Now, since R? is not a conditionalizing rule for c, there is c(Ei) > 0 and c′
in C?i such that c
′(−) 6= ci(−). Then there is a decision problem d such that
Adc′,g does not maximise expected utility with respect to ci. And thus
∑
w∈W
ci(w)u(Adci , f , w) > ∑
w∈W
ci(w)u(Adc′,g, w)
In this case, the inequality above is strict, as required.
Now:
• If R? is deterministic but not conditionalizing, let αic′ = 1 for all c′ in
Ci. This gives Theorem 5.
• If R? is non-deterministic but stochastic, let αic′ = P(R?ic′ |Ei) be the
probability of R?ic′ given Ei. This gives Theorem 7.
• If R? is non-deterministic and non-stochastic, let αic′ = 1|C?i | . This gives
Theorem 8.
This establishes Lemma 16(ii). 2
8.3 Expected Epistemic Utility Argument
As in the previous section, we first prove a lemma. Theorems 9, 11, and 12
all follow as corollaries.
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Lemma 17
(i) If R, R? are conditionalizing rules for c, and f , g are selection functions,
then
∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R, w) = ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R?, w)
(ii) If R is a conditionalizing rule for c, and R? is not, and f , g are selection
functions, then
∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R, w) > ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R?, w)
Proof of Lemma 17. First, (i). Suppose R and R? are conditionalizing rules
for c. Then,
• If c(Ei) > 0, then ci(−) = c?i (−), so EU(ci, w) = EU(c?i , w) and
c(Ei)EU(ci, w) = c(Ei)EU(c?i , w)
• If c(Ei) = 0, then
c(Ei)EU(ci, w) = c(Ei)EU(c?i , w)
So
∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w)EU(ci, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈W
ci(w)EU(ci, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈W
c?i (w)EU(c
?
i , w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w)EU(c?i , w)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R?, w)
as required. This establishes Lemma 17(i).
Second, (ii). Suppose R is a conditionalizing rule, and R? is not. Now,
suppose that, for each Ei in E and c′ in C?i , there is αic′ > 0 such that, for
each Ei in E , ∑c′∈C?i αic′ = 1 and
EU(R?, w) = ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′EU(c
′, w)
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Then, for all Ei in E and c′ in C?i ,
∑
w∈W
ci(w)EU(ci, w) ≥ ∑
w∈W
ci(w)EU(c′, w)
with strict inequality if c′ 6= ci. Then
∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w)EU(ci, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈Ei
ci(w)EU(ci, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈W
ci(w) ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′EU(ci, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′ ∑
w∈W
ci(w)EU(ci, w)
≥ ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′ ∑
w∈W
ci(w)EU(c′, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈Ei
ci(w) ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′EU(c
′, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w) ∑
c′∈C?i
αic′EU(c
′, w)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R?, w)
Now, since R? is not a conditionalizing rule for c, there is c(Ei) > 0 and c′
in C?i such that c
′ 6= ci. Thus
∑
w∈W
ci(w)EU(ci, w) > ∑
w∈W
ci(w)u(c′, w)
In this case, the inequality above is strict, as required. Now:
• If R? is deterministic but not conditionalizing, let αic′ = 1 for all c′ in
C?i . This gives Theorem 9.
• If R? is non-deterministic but stochastic, let αic′ = P(R?ic′ |Ei) be the
probability of R?ic′ given Ei. This gives Theorem 11.
• If R? is non-deterministic and non-stochastic, let αic′ = 1|C?i | . This gives
Theorem 12.
This establishes Lemma 16(ii). 2
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9 Accuracy dominance argument
Theorem 13 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility func-
tion. And suppose c is a prior and R is a deterministic updating rule. Then:
(i) if 〈c, R〉 is non-conditionalizing, there is 〈c?, R?〉 such that, for all w
EU(〈c, R〉, w) < EU(〈c?, R?〉, w))
(ii) if 〈c, R〉 is conditionalizing, then for any 〈c?, R?〉 there is some w such that
EU(〈c, R〉, w) ≥ EU(〈c?, R?〉, w))
Proof of Theorem 13. First, (i). Suppose R is deterministic but not condi-
tionalizing for c. This is the case covered by (Briggs & Pettigrew, 2018). So
R = (E = {E1, . . . , En}, C = {C1, . . . , Cn}), and, for each Ei, Ci = {ci}. So
we can write 〈c, R〉 as a (n + 1)-dimensional vector of credence functions:
〈c, c1, . . . , cn〉
Now consider the following set of updating plans:
WR = {wR = 〈w, c1, . . . , ci−1, w, ci+1, . . . , cn〉 : Ei ∈ E & w ∈ Ei}
Thus, wR is the updating plan that has the credence function w as its prior,
and will update exactly as R does except in world w where it will stick with
w. Then we can show that 〈c, R〉 is not in the convex hull of WR. After all:
Lemma 18 〈c, R〉 is in the convex hull of WR iff R is conditionalizing for c.
Proof of Lemma 18. Let’s prove the left-to-right direction first. Suppose
〈c, R〉 is in the convex hull of WR. Then there is 0 ≤ αw ≤ 1 such that
• c(−) = ∑w∈W αww(−);
• ci(−) = ∑w∈Ei αww(−) +∑w 6∈Ei αwci(−)
Thus,
ci(X) = c(XEi) + c(Ei)ci(X)
And so
ci(X) = c(X|Ei)
as required.
Next, the right-to-left direction. Suppose R is conditionalizing for c. So
ci(X) = c(X|Ei). Then let αw = c(w). It is easy to check that 〈c, R〉 is in the
convex hull of WR, as required. 2
Proof of Theorem 13(i) continued. Now, suppose EU is an additive, strictly
proper epistemic utility function. Then, by Proposition 2 in (Predd et al.,
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2009), there is a Bregman divergenceD such that EU(c, w) = −D(w, c). Let
Dn+1 be the Bregman divergence between (n + 1)-dimensional vectors of
credence functions that sums the Bregman divergences between the n + 1
credence functions. Thus, by Proposition 3 in (Predd et al., 2009), since
〈c, R〉 is not in the convex hull of WR, there is 〈c?, R?〉 in the convex hull of
WR such that, for all Ei in E and w in Ei,
Dn+1((w, c1, . . . , ci−1, w, ci+1, . . . , cn), (c?, c?1 , . . . , c
?
n)) <
Dn+1((w, c1, . . . , ci−1, w, ci+1, . . . , cn), (c, c1, . . . , cn))
But
Dn+1((w, c1, . . . , ci−1, w, ci+1, . . . , cn), (c, c1, . . . , cn)) =
D(w, c) +D(w, ci) = −EU(R, w)
And
Dn+1((w, c1, . . . , ci−1, w, ci+1, . . . , cn), (c?, c?1 , . . . , c
?
n)) ≥
D(w, c?) +D(w, c?i ) = −EU(R?, w)
So EU(R?, w) > EU(R, w) for all w in W, as required. This establishes
Theorem 13(i).
Second, (ii). Suppose 〈c, R〉 is conditionalizing, and suppose 〈c?, R?〉 is
an alternative pair where R? is deterministic. Then we show that c expects
〈c, R〉 to have at least as much epistemic utility as it expects 〈c?, R?〉 to have.
So the latter cannot EU-dominate the former.
∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(〈c, R〉, w)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(c, w) + ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R, w)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(c, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈Ei
ci(w)EU(ci, w)
≥ ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(c?, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
c(Ei) ∑
w∈Ei
ci(w)EU(c?i , w)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(c?, w) + ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(R?, w)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(〈c?, R?〉, w)
as required. This establishes Theorem 13(ii). 2
Before we prove our next theorem, we state and prove this lemma:
Lemma 19 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility function.
Suppose C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a finite set of credence functions where m > 1.
Suppose α1, . . . , αm > 0 and ∑mj=1 αj = 1. Then there is a credence function c
?
such that, for w in W,
EU(c?, w) >
m
∑
j=1
αjEU(c, w)
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Proof of Lemma 19. Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic
utility function. Then, for each possible world w, we abuse notation and
write w for the credence function defined on F such that w(X) = 1 if X is
true at w and w(X) = 0 if X is false at w. Then, by Proposition 2 from (Predd
et al., 2009), there is a Bregman divergenceD that measures the divergence
from one credence function to another such that EU(c, w) = −D(w, c).
Suppose C contains m > 1 credence functions. And suppose α1, . . . , αm >
0 and ∑mj=1 αj = 1. We can then use D to generate a Bregman divergence
between two m-tuples of credence functions as follows:
Dα((c1, . . . , cm), (c′1, . . . , c
′
m)) =
m
∑
j=1
αjD(cj, c′j)
So
Dα((w, . . . , w), (c1, . . . , cm)) = −
m
∑
j=1
αjEU(cj, w)
Now consider the following set of m-tuples of credence functions:
W = {(w, . . . , w) : w ∈W}
Then (c1, . . . cm) is in the convex hull ofW iff c1 = c2 = . . . = cm. Thus, by
Proposition 3 in (Predd et al., 2009), if ci 6= cj for some 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, then
there is (c?, . . . , c?) in the convex hull ofW such that, for w in W,
Dα((w, . . . , w), (c?, . . . , c?)) < Dα((w, . . . , w), (c1, . . . , cm))
So
m
∑
j=1
αjEU(c?, w) = EU(c?, w) >
m
∑
j=1
αjEU(cj, w)
as required. 2
Theorem 15 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility function.
Then, if 〈c, R〉 is non-conditionalizing, there is 〈c?, R?〉 such that, for all w,
EU(〈c, R〉, w) < EU(〈c?, R?〉, w)
Proof of Theorem 15. Suppose 〈c, R〉 is non-conditionalizing. If R is deter-
ministic, we can appeal to Theorem 13. If R is non-deterministic, then we
can use Lemma 19 to construct a dominating pair 〈c?, R?〉. After all, if Ci
contains more than one possible posterior, then there are αic′ > 0 such that
∑c′∈Ci α
i
c′ = 1 and, for w in Ei,
EU(R, w) = ∑
c′∈Ci
αic′EU(c
′, w)
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If R is stochastic, then αic′ = P(R
i
c′ |Ei); if R is non-stochastic, then αic′ = 1|Ci | .
Now, by Lemma 19, there is c?i such that, for all w in W,
EU(c?i , w) > ∑
c′∈Ci
αic′EU(c
′, w)
Thus, let R? be the updating rule such that C?j = Cj for all j 6= i, and
C?i = {c?i }. Also, let c? = c. Then:
EU(〈c?, R?〉, w) > EU(〈c, R〉, w)
as required. 2
Theorem 14 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility function.
Then:
(i) If R is a weak or strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, there is no 〈c?, R?〉
such that, for all Ei in E , w in Ei, c′ in Ci and c?′ in C?i
EU(〈c, R〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′) < EU(〈c?, R?〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′)
(ii) There are rules R that are not weak or strong super-conditionalizing rules
for c such that there is no 〈c?, R?〉 such that, for all Ei in E , w in Ei, c′ in Ci
and c?′ in C?i
EU(〈c, R〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′) < EU(〈c?, R?〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′)
Proof of Theorem 14. First, (i). Suppose 〈c, R〉 is a weak or a strong super-
conditionalizing pair. Thus, we can extend c to c∗ so that, for Ei in E and c′
in Ci, if c∗(Ei) > 0.
c′(−) = c∗(−|Ric′)
Thus,
c∗(w & Ric′) = c
∗(Ric′)c
′(w)
Now suppose 〈c?, R?〉 is an alternative prior-rule pair. Then extend c∗ fur-
ther so that:
c∗(w & Ric′ & R
?i
c?′ ) =
1
|C?i |
c∗(w & Ric′) =
1
|C?i |
c∗(Ric′)c
′(w)
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Then:
∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
∑
c′∈Ci
∑
c?′∈Ci
c∗(w & Ric′ & R
?i
c?′)EU(〈c, R〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(c, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
∑
w∈Ei
c∗(w & Ric′)EU(c
′, w)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(c, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(Ric′) ∑
w∈W
c′(w)EU(c′, w)
≥ ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(c?, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
c∗(Ric′) ∑
w∈W
c′(w)EU(c?′, w)
= ∑
w∈W
c(w)EU(c?, w) + ∑
Ei∈E
∑
c′∈Ci
∑
w∈W
c∗(w & Ric′)EU(c
?′, w)
= ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
∑
c′∈Ci
∑
c?′∈Ci
c∗(w & Ric′ & R
?i
c?′)EU(〈c?, R?〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′)
Thus, it cannot be the case that for all Ei in E , w in Ei, c′ in Ci and c?′ in C?i
EU(〈c, R〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′) < EU(〈c?, R?〉, w & Ric′ & R?ic?′)
This establishes Theorem 14(i).
Next, (ii). Suppose E = {E1, . . . , En} and w1, w2 are in E1. Then pick c,
c1, c2 so that they lie on the line between w1 and w2. Pick: c very close to
w1; c1 very close to c, but slightly further towards w2; and c2 right at the
end of the line at w2. So c is not in the convex hull of c1 and c2. Next, define
R = (E , C) with C1 = {c1, c2}. Now suppose c? is an alternative prior and
R? = (E , C?) is an alternative updating rule, with c?′ in C?1 . Then, if 〈c?, R?〉
dominates 〈c, R〉, then:
(i) EU(c, w1) + EU(c1, w1) < EU(c?, w1) + EU(c?′, w1)
(ii) EU(c, w2) + EU(c2, w2) < EU(c?, w2) + EU(c?′, w2)
Now, suppose c? is equal to c or lies between c and w1. Then EU(c?, w2) ≤
EU(c, w2). But since c2 = w2, EU(c?′, w2) ≤ EU(c2, w2). So
EU(c, w2) + EU(c2, w2) ≥ EU(c?, w2) + EU(c?′, w2)
which contradicts (ii). And similarly for c?′. So both c? and c?′ must lie
strictly between c and w2. And indeed, they must lie strictly between c and
c1. If one or other lies between c1 and w2, then
EU(c, w2) + EU(c1, w1) ≥ EU(c?, w1) + EU(c?′, w1)
which contradicts (i). Now, since EU is continuous in its first argument and
EU(c, w2) < EU(c2, w2), we can always pick c1 so that it’s close enough to
c that EU(c1, w2) is close enough to EU(c, w2) that
EU(c1, w2) + EU(c1, w2) < EU(c, w2) + EU(c2, w2)
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But then, since c? and c?′ lie between c1 and c, we have
EU(c?, w2)+EU(c?′, w2) < EU(c1, w2)+EU(c1, w2) < EU(c, w2)+EU(c2, w2)
which contradicts (ii). This gives our contradiction. So 〈c?, R?〉 does not
dominate 〈c, R〉. 2
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